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1.0 Background of the study
Housing wealth as a source of retiree income is normally neglected. This form of wealth
could have an incremental value on the homeowner's retirement income if they could
be able to leverage this ownership as collateral for capital. Releasing home equity may
result in a marked increase in consumption, a drop in public pension liability and access
to long-term care facilities. This may also ease the tax burden imposed by the increasing
population ageing on the traditional state-funded retirement provisions.
1.1 An overview of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
The conversion of home equity into cash while the homeowner is still alive is referred to
as home equity conversion (Phillips & Gwin, 1993). Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
is one of the Equity Release Products (ERPs) that enables the elderly, retired people to
use their houses which have no financial liability as a source of income while they
continue to reside in them, thereby seeking to address constraints of the life cycle
hypothesis (Luiz & Stobie, 2010). It is a relatively new concept in the field of home
wealth and is one of the emerging issues, mostly common in the United States of
America and Canada. Unlike mortgages, home equity conversion mortgage is a type of
a reverse mortgage which allows one to borrow money using the equity in their home
as security. This mortgage enables those who own their homes to receive income
regularly as a means of drawing down home equity slowly (Kutty, 1996) and as
reported by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP, 2001), the conversion
of the home equity into cash can be done without the homeowner moving out or
repaying the loan each month. Repayment of the principal and interest is only required
once the borrower dies or moves out of the home. The initial mortgage amount, the
interest rate accruals, the duration of the loan and rate of home price appreciation are
taken into account so as to prevent the loan amount from exceeding the value of the
home over the life of the loan. It is a requirement that there be no other liens against the
home. Offsetting of any existing liens on the home is a prerequisite before entering into
the reverse mortgage contract.
Reverse mortgage payments can be made out in several options. The option of a lump
sum at once, a tenure plan in the form of monthly annuity payments for as long as the






















borrower's choice, or the option of combining these options (Ma & Deng, 2006).The
determinants of the amount that can be borrowed through reverse mortgage are the
borrower's age and the value of the home. According to Redfoot et al (Redfoot, Scholen,
& Brown, 2007), the funds that can be offered as loan advances increase with an increase
in the age of the borrower.
1.2 Impediments to the success of reverse mortgage
Due to their non-recourse nature, a low home equity could entail a loss for the lender.
Such a loss may arise when the value of the property is less than the value of the loan
during sale. This result in lenders basing the maximum percentage of equity that can be
borrowed on the life expectancy of the individual, the probable property price
movements and the expected interest rates (Mitchell, Olivia, & Piggott, 2004).
There is also the risk of default whereby the borrower remains in the house after the
loan balance which has amortized negatively exceeds the value of the house. This is a
crossover risk and can be reduced by the use of an explicit reverse mortgage pricing
model which allows for evaluation of this crossover option. Alternative means involve
setting up insurance mechanisms and securitization which are viewed as secondary
markets channels. The lenders also have to set a limit to the amount of loan that can be
offered.
Potential clients may be unwilling to take up this mortgage as they will no longer be
eligible for additional sources of income from the state. Golant claimed that depending
on one's state of residence, these reverse mortgage loan advances may affect one's
ability to qualify for some of the supplementary sources of income and benefits from
welfares (Golant, 1992).
Another major hindrance to the growth of the reverse mortgage market is the fact that
reverse mortgage entails a borrower borrowing his or her own money in the form of
housing equity, and paying out a substantial amount of interest and loan charges in
return which renders reverse mortgages considerably expensive way of generating cash
income especially during periods which interest rates are high.
There is also the need to leave a form of inheritance to one's dependants. Caplin
suggested that a strong motive for bequest may cause homeowners to avoid the reverse
mortgage market (Caplin, 2000). According to Mayer and Simons, many elderly people
who have children would still want to pass on their assets to them even when their
liquid wealth is meager and reverse mortgage could help improve their situation
especially in an emergency (Mayer, Simons, & Christopher, 1994). This might also be a







are greatly attached to their homes and view them as a bequest to be passed down to
their heirs.
Potential appreciation of the value one's house determines their eligibility for reverse
mortgage. A lender would not want to have a loss due to lower appreciation rates of the
house as compared to outstanding loan balance rate. In his work, Golant found that
reverse mortgages were particularly beneficial to persons living alone, especially the
very old with lower incomes, may. However, most of the people in this very group live
in low-valued homes which have a low appreciation potential as a result of de clining
neighborhoods, and are therefore not considered as potentially attractive for a reverse
mortgage (Golant, 1992).
Proper maintenance of the houses in question is an integral part of the success of any
reverse mortgage arrangement. For instant, the Housing and Urban Development
Department's reverse mortgage contract has a provision which requires the borrower to
maintain their house (Offfice of Policy Development and Research, 1993) . However
there is the risk of difficulties in enforcing such contract provision which declares that
failure to maintain the house constitutes a default on the loan. Case in point is the
speculations around whether the HUD is able to enforce such a clause and whether the
courts would allow them to enforce the contracts if they are bold enough to.
Rosenbaum et al (Rosenbaum, Goren, & Jacobs, 1995) argued that the requirement by
reverse mortgage lenders that the liability for home maintenance fall on the borrower is
unrealistic. This is because such a clause might be difficult to enforce given the target
market of reverse mortgage which in HUD's case is persons over the age of sixty two.
Case in point is their argument that proving to a court the reason as to why a ninety
year old widow must install a new twenty-year roof can prove to be an uphill task.
They claim that homeowners may not be able to take up property management and
maintenance responsibility.
Despite its potential risks, a reverse mortgage's repayment schedule and its non-
recourse nature gives it a competitive edge over the other means of tapping into home
equity. The various payment options offered also allow gives the borrowers flexibility
with respect to the type of income stream they would require as this is determined by
the purpose for which the cash will be used and varies from one person to another. The
fact that interest and principal payments do not have to be made during the term of the
loan makes it more attractive to most homeowners. The loan is repayment is on the sale
of the house by either the borrower or the lender when the homeowner moves
permanently or dies. Bayer and Harper reported that 95 percent of Americans age 75
and above had the desire to remain in their current home for as long as possible (Bayer
& Harper, 2000). This repayment feature enables those who are unwilling to move out
of their homes to tap into their home equity.
A condition for a successful reverse mortgage market is that the people must own their




















The high percentage of wealth which elderly people have tied up in property is one of
the factors facilitating the development of the Equity Release Products (Gadner, 2003)
1.3 Motivation for the study
In most cases in developing countries, the gap between income before retirement and
post-retirement income is normally huge and the pension received is never enough to
cater for the various expenses incurred. Such cases are rampant among the middle-
income and low-income earners whose savings and pensions is sl:illnot enough to cover
their expenditure.
Better lifestyle and improved health among Kenyans has resulted in a longer life
expectancy and the ability to maintain an active lifestyle into retirement. The life
expectancy in Kenya rose from 57.8 to 59.6 in 1985 where it hit a snag and had dropped



























Figure 1: Trends in Kenya's Human Development Index component indices 1980-2014
The ratio of retirees to the working-age population in Kenya has also been increasing
over time due to the increase in life expectancy, the fact that some people opt to retire
earlier than the age of 60 and a drop in the fertility rates as most women opt have
children past the age of 30 due to prior commitments such as education and career
advancement. This significant increase in population ageing has put strain on the public
purse due to the increasingly heavy dependency on government-funded benefits. Early
retirement and population ageing tend to result in a narrower tax base and drainage of
public resources. According to the Pensions Act (The National Treasury), the pension in
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final pensionable salary for each completed month of pensionable service, subject to a
maximum of the highest pensionable salary drawn by the officer in the course of his
service.
This pension income is considerably low as evidenced by the current retirement benefits
replacement rate. Despite the Retirement Benefit Authority's aim of increasing the
figure to 35% from 20% as at 2009, Kenya's estimated overall retirement benefits
replacemen t rate still falls far below then International Labor Organiza tion
recommended rate of 40% per couple. This is quite low as compared to those of
developed countries which average 60% -70% such as in Denmark, Sweden, Australia
and Germany (Chirchir, 2010).This results in a pension income that is unable to meet
the needs of the retirees.
This combination of demographic aging, early retirement,low pension income and
earnings-based pension system result in an increase in pension costs and may
necessitate an overall restructuring of the national pension system with time to meet the
increasing costs. However many countries are constrained in terms of their budget. This
brings to light the need for an alternative means of financing old-age consumption
which supplements the existing pension plans while still tailored to the needs of the
elderly. Such an alternative is the home equity conversion mortgage.
This study focuses on the feasibility of such a mortgage in Kenya. The main proposition
of this study is that Home Equity Conversion Mortgage can be a viable source of post
retirement income which will increase consumer spending after retirement thus
stimulating the economy.
1.4 Problem statement
The current pension in Kenya is quite low and does not adequately provide for
retirement income especially in cases where unexpected but significantly high bills such
as medical costs arise. This situation is set to become worse due to an increase in
demographic aging. The projected increase in population post retirement will result in a
further strain on the already low pension budget. The table below shows the anticipated
changes in the older age groups projected in the report based on the current























Absolute and Percent Change in Older Age Groups: 1989 to 2020
(Absolute numbers in thousands)
Year 55 and over 65 and over 75 and over
1989 1,243 509 132
%change (88) (95) (109)
2005 5,335 995 276
%change (90) (90) (103)
2020 4,440 1,895 559
These result in the need for alternative source of financing that supplements the
pension income. A possible way to minimize this disconnect is by offering reverse
mortgage to this group. This product could provide feasible alternative or additional
income in retirement without getting home owner into debt especially in Kenya where
people have a rural and urban home. The problem then is to test whether a Home























The objectives of this study is to determine the feasibility of Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage in Kenya
1.6 Research question
Is Home Equity Conversion Mortgage feasible in the Kenyan market?
1.7 Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis is:
H01: HECM is not feasible in the Kenyan market























This section provides an overview of the previous studies on the feasibility,
terminations and the risks faced in the implementation of the Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage.
2.1 Feasibility of HECM
Housing equity had remained an untapped source of wealth for quite some time until
recent years when reverse mortgage programs gained some popularity.
The survey by Bayer and Harper showed that many people prefer staying in their
homes for as long as possible (Bayer & Harper, 2000).According to Bishop and Shan, the
willingness and ability of homeowners to consume their housing wealth is one of the
determinants of the degree to which housing equity should be considered as retirement
savings. They claim that reverse mortgages can improve the welfare especially in cases
where the homeowners have strong psychological attachment to their homes as they
generate additional income and liquid wealth for elderly homeowners and at the same
time enabling them the continual residence in their homes (Bishop & Shan, 2008).
Findings by the Health Insurance Association of America suggest that home equity
conversion plans serve as useful mechanisms for financing long-term care (LTC)
expenses as most of the people over the age of sixty five own their own homes and that
eighty percent of these homes have no mortgage (The .Health Insurance Association of . .
America, 1992). The report states that older women are most likely to incur significant
long-term care expenses due to greater longevity and lower incomes than men and that
a substantial number of elderly women could meet their long term care expenditures
through home equity conversions due to the fact that some of these older women own
their own homes, and the others will inherit their husbands' homes.
Venti and Wise looked into the potential effects of reverse annuity mortgages in
increasing the current income of the elderly. They found that the elderly who are single
and have a low income would be able to get an approximate fifty percent increase in
their income. However the chances of this group having housing equity was very low
(Venti & Wise, Aging and the income value of housing wealth, 1991). In then:
subsequent work, they concluded that home equity of the elderly could serve as a
supplement to their current income (Venti & Wise, 1993). Burns &·Widdows, and
Hogarth also concluded that that the inclusion of home equity wealth to generate
income and reduce expense in the estimation of savings needed for the retirement






















Mayer and Simons (Mayer, Simons, & Christopher, 1994) looked at both income
increases and debt reductions effect of HECMs and they found that a large portion of
homeowners in the U.S. could increase their effective monthly income by at least
twenty percent. The numbers were quite an improvement in the uptake of reverse
mortgage in comparison to the previous work by Merrill et al. (Merrill, Finkel, & Kutty,
1994) who found that only a small number of elderly who they had surveyed and who
owned their homes could benefit substantially from reverse mortgages using the 1989
American Housing Survey (AHS).
Williams and Kao (Williams & Kao, 1997) also examined the supplementary effect of the
amount of funds which had been availed from home equity conversation on elderly
people with different characteristics. They analyzed the 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finances and found that income flow could be increased by $427 monthly if the term
reverse mortgage plan were used and $305 if the tenure reverse mortgage procedure
were used, noting that home equity through reverse mortgages would be a significant
income supplement to elderly householders' current level of income regardless of type
utilized.
However, despite its possible supplementary effects on post retirement income, the
reverse mortgage market has had a slow growth. One of the main reasons as to the slow
pickup rate of reverse mortgages is the bequest motive. Studies by Mayer and Simons
(Mayer, Simons, & Christopher, 1994)and Caplin (Caplin, 2000) find that a strong
motive for bequest could lead to avoidance of the reverse mortgages. This however
does not fully explain the low demand for reverse mortgage due to the fact that some
homeowners have no children. Such is the case whereby Mayer and Simons (Mayer,
Simons, & Christopher, 1994) also estimate that more than 1.3 million homeowners have
no children yet are still unwilling to take up reverse mortgage.
A possible explanation is the need to protect oneself against unprecedented occurrences
such as sudden and unexpectedly high medical expenses, a frequent occurrence in old
age. This form of insurance against health expenses is brought out in the report by
Munnel et al (Munnel, Alicia, Mauricio, & Jean-Pierre, 2007) after conducting a survey
on homeowners between the age of 50 and 65. Half of the 2,673 respondents who were
not planning on tapping their housing equity in retirement gave this form of self-
insurance as the reason.
Despite the possible impediments, HECMs have had favorable outcome. In their
evaluation report of the HECM progress to Congress, Rodda et al (Rodda, David,
Christopher, & Hin-Kin, 2000) concluded that the demonstration phase of HECM had
been successful as evidenced by the growing loan volumes, borrowers having been satisfied
with the program, projected increase in premium collections in excess of insurance claims,
















makes HECM a viable venture with potentially positive impacts on consumption habits and
income smoothening past retirement.
2.2 Reverse mortgage model and termination.
DiVenti and Herzog investigated the actuarial aspects of HECM by attempting to
estimate the amount of the level payment of tenure HECM (Diventi & Herzog, 1991).
They used a statistical model based on Herzog and Rubin (1984) and incorporated a
wide range of assumptions and variations associated with the key parameters of the
model. They found that HECM programs whereby future appreciation is shared
equally between the lender and the borrower or ones in which only one of the parties
get a hundred percent of the nominal appreciation are both viable. They also found that
the monthly payments are slightly higher in the latter case.
Szymanoski (Szymanoski E., 1990) examined reverse mortgage loan terminations. He
carried out an analysis of the risks involved with reverse mortgage insurance and
looked at the pricing model developed for the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
which was being offered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
He noted that having had no prior program experiencer HECM insurance had been
priced based on untested assumptions which were reasonable. The 1989 model had
assumed that with regard to mortality and vohmtary terminations, the termination rate
would be 1.3 times of the female borrowers' mortality rate. Szymanoski, DiVenti, and
Chow found that the HUD had underestimated total terminations, consequently
overestimating loan survival rates especially for the YOllilger borrowers at the onset of
the loans. They noted that HUD's termination experience had not been able to
distinguish between mortality and move-out due to the fact that it does not collect
complete data on borrowers I deaths (Szymanoski, Chow, & DiVenti, 2007).
Davidoff and Welke's findings of quicker termination of the reverse mortgage
borrowers and subsequent exit from their homes as compared to similar homeowners
with no HECM contrast expectations of adverse selection in the HECM program, where
reverse mortgages is entered into by the borrowers who expect to stay in their homes
longer, thereby taking advantage of the insurance feature of the product that results
from the balance on the mortgage exceeding the house value. They suggest that reverse
mortgage borrowers tend to have a stronger desire to extract home equity through both
















Like any other financial product, HECMs are exposed to certain types of risks. These
include longetivity risk, interest rate risk, crossover risk, selection and moral hazard.
Some homeowners may use the fact that the risk of poor performance of their homes is
borne by investors as an incentive to neglect the maintenance of their home values
especially when it is costly to do so which may result in some serious future losses.
Shiller and Weiss present a calibrated model for assessing such moral hazard risk. Their
model assumes that individuals are fully aware of their actions and they act in a
manner that is in their own self interest (Shiller, Robert, & Weiss, 2000).
Boehm and Ehrhardt developed and applied a valuation model that quantified the risks
associated with fixed-rate reverse mortgage loans. They found that the difference
between the risk of a reverse mortgage and that of a typical coupon bond or a regular
mortgage is extremely large, with reverse mortgage having the higher interest rate risk.
(Boehm & Ehrhardt, 1994).
Davidoff and Welke looked into selection and moral hazard in the reverse mortgage
market (Davidoff & Welke, 2005). Their findings contrast the belief that reverse
mortgage lenders are likely to be influenced by adverse selection on the basis of their
mobility and moral hazard on the basis of home maintenance. Their model of reverse
mortgage demand concludes that reverse mortgage debt's effect on maintenance is
ambiguous, moral hazard is likely to operate on mobility and that selection based on
mobility can be advantageous.
HECMs also have a crossover risk which as defined by Chinloy and Megbolugbe is the
risk that the value of the equity may be exceeded by the outstanding loan balance
(Chinloy & Megbolugbe, 1994). According to Wang et aI, the factors which influence
crossover risk are interest rates, house prices and mortality rates (Huang, Wang, &
Miao, 2011). They designed a crossover bond which enables the partial transfer of















This study makes use of inflation, interest rate and housing value data which are
collectible from secondary sources. The primary source of the information on property
price movements and inflation will be the HassConsult property index database. The
interest rate used to approximate the risk-free rate shall be the 91-day Treasury bill day
rates and shall be obtained from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) database.
3.1 The model set up
These payment models are based on DiVenti and Herzog's work which investigates the
actuarial aspects of HECMs and attempts to estimate the amount of the level-payment
of tenure HECM (Diventi & Herzog, 1991)and the Interim Report to Congress on Home
Equity Conversion Mortgage Insurance by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Szymanoski E., 1990).
3.2 Assumptions
Both assume an insurance premium structure which consists of;
• 2 percent of the appraised value of the property payable at origination
• Annual insurance fee of 0.5 percent of the actual outstanding loan and is payable
Monthly
The future property values appreciation follow a random walk.
The move-out factor is approximately similar to the move-out factor when the U.S
HECM program was set in motion (owing to the lack of data on the current move-out
factor in Kenya).
DiVenti and Herzog (1990) assume that the insurer/mortgagee has a share of any future
appreciation of the house.
3.3 Predicting future property values
Future property values cannot be predicted as they are a geometric Brownian motion
process which follows a random walk. The assumption therefore is that these values
can be simulated by a stochastic geometric Brownian motion process since stochastic
specification allows future property values to vary considerably about their expected
values without violating the model's actuarial assumptions. Non-stochastic models can
also be used. However they would be poor because property values must be predicted



















effectively and captures expected losses more accurately than a non-stochastic model
would, and thereby places less reliance on the contingency reserve to cover unexpected
losses.
DiVenti and Herzog (1990) state that non-stochastic estimates of the annual rate of the
nominal appreciation may not be precise because the rate may vary widely from year to
year and from neighborhood to neighborhood and that the expenses involved in annual
appraisals on individual houses is quite impractical.
This is justified by the interim report by considering the property that has been
mortgaged a zero-coupon real asset which assumes the return on the owner-occupied
housing does not include rent and includes the expected price inflation, Jl and a
stochastic term (Y , to describe deviations from expected inflation. The resulting
differential equation;
dh d •- = Jl t s- aaz
h
Where dh r dt and dz are the differential of the house value, time and a stochastic
variable which is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1
respectively.
Under the random walk assumption, each property's annual appreciation rate is treated
as an independent observation of a normally distributed random variable with constant
mean, Jl and standard deviation, (Y (interim report, 1990)
H(t) = HoeY(/ )
Where H(t) is the property value at some future time,t
H, is the initial property value
Y(t) =Jl(t)+V/(t)













Owing to the fact that a standard Brownian motion iSIfl(/) normally distributed for all
I> 0 , the distribution of H (I) is log-normal for all t > 0
However, unlike the random walk model, the serial correlation model supports the
argument that the annual percentage rates of change are not independent. Case and
Schiller (1989) looked into the efficiency of the real estate market to see whether price
changes are independent or they are serially correlated. They found evidence of
correlation in city-wide price indices over short time periods. Their findings were
however not conclusive with regard to accepting or rejecting the random walk model
for predicting individual house price changes as the volatility of individual house prices
was found to be of far greater magnitude than the serialcorrelation found in the index.
3.4 Expected Mortgage Insurance Premium
This is to protect the lender from the probability of the outstanding loan being greater
than the house value. It is the present value of the expected losses.
MIP(/)=max[L, -(I-r)HpOJ
Where j'v.lIp(t) is the scheduled Mortgage Insurance Premium in montht,
Hris the value of the property at time T
L; is the outstanding loan balance at termination
r is the proportional transaction costs, and
LX+I is the probability that a HECM loan originated by a borrower with initial agex IS
still in force t months after origination.
The expected present value of the mortgage insurance premiums is:
t
L 111s Lx+t MIP(t)
o















Kenya Mortality Tables (KE 2001 - 2003) are used to compute the LX+I .The female table
is used because female life expectancy is longer than that of males and most HECM
applicants are expected to be single females (Interim report, 1990).
The figures can be adjusted to produce the required monthly probabilities. They are
also adjusted for loan terminations for reasons other than death of the borrower by
multiplying them by a hypothetical "move-out factor". We use the HECM's move-out
factor of 30percent which is sufficiently conservative owing to the fact that it is less than
the 47 percent for mortality for those 85 and over which was estimated by Jacobs (1988).
These adjusted figures can then be converted into monthly loan survival probabilities
using the equation;
L =(Soo [Si,j+1 ]f2 JI+m
H I l ,j s. .
l , j
Where
i =initial age in years = {62,63,... ,99} ,
j = attained age in full years={i,i+l, ... , lOO},
x = initial age in months = 12; ,
t =attained age minus initial age in months.= 12(J-I)+r
r =months between attained ages j and j + 1= {0,I,... ,11}i
and m is the move-out rate expressed as a decimal = 0.3
3.5 Expected losses
This is the present value of expected insurance claim losses. A loss results when the
outstanding balance exceeds the house value.
LettingB(t) represent the outstanding balance on the mortgage at timet, if the
mortgage is terminated during timet and if the value of the house is greater thanB(t),
then there is no loss. But if the house value is less than B (t), there is a loss. The
magnitude of the loss, which is the difference between the amount B(t) and the

















The expected loss for each month into the future denoted Ej L(t)] is estimated to be the
probability of termination multiplied by the difference between the house value less the
transaction costs and the loan amount given that the loan has survived to that date,
evaluated at time t. The probability of loan termination d (t) at a given time is similar to
the calculation of the probability of death from an actuarial survival table.
The expected loss at time t is given by;
E[L(t)] ={B(t) - E[H(t)]}d (t)
3.6 The principal limit method
Loan advance payments are calculated using a principal limit factor which is a measure of the
percentage of the maximum claim amount that is available to the borrower once the mortgage is
in effect and contains within it an assumption about how long the borrower will live and the
appreciation rate of the property. It is the present value of the mortgage benefits that can be
received by a borrower.
The principal limit at any time t is given by:
PL(t) =F(x,R)MCA(l+cr
Where;
PL(t) is the principal limit at time t
F(x,R) is the principal limit factor for a borrower of agex and fixed interest rater
which is the expected rate
MeA is the maximum claim amount
c is the periodic compounding rate which equals the expected rater plus the 1/2
percent annual mortgage insurance premium charge converted to a monthly rate
t is the number of months after loan origination o:s;t :s; T , with T being the value of
t for which the borrower turns 100 years old.
The net principal limit is the amount that can be borrowed at any other time given that
one has already taken out a portion of their housing equity before. It is given by:






















Where NPL(t) is the net principal limit at timet
PL(t) is the principal limit given by the previous equation
B(r,t) is the actual loan balance at timet including cash advances, interest accrued and
JvfIP.
For borrowers who opt for a line-of-credit,NPL(t) is the maximum cash advance
available at each timet. Once the net principal limit goes to zero, the line-of-credit is
exhausted.
For those who wish level monthly cash advances, either for a specified term, or for as
long as the borrower retains in occupancy of the property, the monthly advance is
given by:
( )
_ NPL (t)(1+ cr
P t,m - 1
(1 +cr+ -(1 +c)
Where;
P(t, m) is the monthly cash advance beginning in month t + I and continuing for a term
ofm months
NPL(t) is the net principal limit at time t
c is the monthly compounding rate given by the expected rater plus the 1/2 percent
annualJvfIP charge converted to a monthly rate
m = (T - t) for tenure, where T is the value of t for which the borrower turns age 100,





l The housing appreciation rates in Kenya are quite low as compared to the interest rateshence the loans grow at a faster rate than the house value. The figures below show the
values for the principal limit factors and Mortgage Insurance Premium for the given
-1 ages and terms. The initial house value is four million.
Figure 3: A table showing the principal limit factors
l Principal limit factors
Age loan term (years)
-1 5 10 15 20 25 30 3565 0.651 0.4 0.256 0.154 0.099 0.065 0.044
66 0.597 0.397 0.268 0.164 0.104 0.067 0.041
-I 67 0.605 0.404 0.249 0.163 0.102 0.065 0.042
68 0.622 0.393 0.252 0.161 0.103 0.066 0.042
69 0.62 0.399 0.254 0.167 0.104 0.066 0.042
l 70 0.634 0.385 0.26 0.163 0.101 0.066 0.04471 0.619 0.402 0.257 0.157 0.102 0.067 0.042
72 0.633 0.415 0.256 0.163 0.105 0.066 0.041
l 73 0.654 0.39 0.256 0.164 0.101 0.064 0.04174 0.623 0.395 0.257 0.165 0.1 0.064
75 0.635 0.397 0.259 0.165 0.102 0.068
j 75 0.621 0.396 0.254 0.159 0.104 0.063
77 0.628 0.394 0.248 0.164 0.102 0.065
78 0.619 0.41 0.243 0.168 0.106 0.063
] 79 0.618 0.402 0.266 0.165 0.103 0.069
80 0.638 0.388 0.246 0.164 0.103
J
81 0.628 0.398 0.253 0.164 0.105
82 0.64 0.406 0.259 0.161 0.102
83 0.513 0.401 0.255 0.162 0.11
J
84 0.613 0.397 0.26 0.161 0.098
85 0.648 0.412 0.262 0.162
86 0.608 0.385 0.253 0.163
1 87 0.636 0.394 0.258 0.156
J 88 0.634 0.384 0.25 0.163
89 0.634 0.418 0.261 0.163








l Figure 4: A table showing theMIP
Mortgage Insurance Premium
l Age Loan term (years)5 10 15 20 25 30 35
65 71363.65 72599.63 61681.44 44697.69 32558.42 23676.58 17102.05
l 66 64979.88 71998.14 64581.2 47462.78 34269.04 24213 16147.0367 65843.26 73332.17 60135.27 47149.42 33776.3 23599.56 16305.88
68 67709.32 71377.62 60839.4 46648.62 33921.55 23742.19 16213.51
-I 69 67479.47 72493.72 61137.39 48459.93 34140.51 23865.57 16419.17
70 69045.05 69903.65 62602.4 47323.8 33393.58 23974 16962.14
71 67334.38 72921.84 61942.17 45577.36 33499.28 24116.39 16531.1
'-1 72 68868.9 75394.45 61826.69 47261.72 34525.54 23947.58 16092.26
73 71189.85 70719.95 61756.93 47605.62 33217.55 23209.76 16120.28
1
74 67831.18 71710.93 61883.79 47759.57 33081.18 23138.37
75 69155.18 72027.61 62391.38 47754.54 33487.89 24753.27
76 67618.98 71960.01 61321.41 46022.22 34177.02 22916.73
l
77 68352.76 71511 59707.16 47647.65 33492.69 23419.5
78 67410.64 74417.84 58703.28 48663.8 34988.24 22656.39
79 6723.055 72917.37 64086.65 47750.04 34126.7 24904.65
1
80 69487.12 70375.14 59200.01 47630.85 34022.95
81 68369.7 72322.85 60969.07 47650.32 34708.59
82 69689.2 73785.83 62475.63 46623.68 33559.38
j
83 66747.68 72804.9 61588.07 47034.43 36186.11
84 66743.2 72070.34 63768.73 46807.07 32447.14
85 70515.5 74717.8 63134.37 46844.18
j 86 66202.54 69956 .78 61020.18 47287.7187 69170.25 71534.7 62277 45254.47
88 68950.1 69744.09 60189.71 47240.85
1
89 68982.52 75948.58 62893.34 47223










l , Figure 5: A comparison of the PLFs and MIPs
In cases, the longer the term the lower the amount that can be lent and the lower the amount of
Mortgage Insurance Premium that is charged.
Mortgage Insurance Premium













Given the fact that the rising life expectancy in Kenya will inevitably increase the public
pension burden with time, the use of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage as a means of





Home Equity Conversion Mortgage can be viable especially if the house value
appreciation rates increases further. This option should be considered especially with
the recent capping of interest rate which has resulted in the regulation of the interest
rates
These mortgages are also viable at high principal limits given the mortality rates and
the mortgage insurance premium which protects the lender in the case of crossover risk.
This product should be exempt from capital gains and transaction tax so as to
encourage its uptake. Clear legal framework should also be build around this product
so as to enable both parties to be safe and secure in their transactions and to minimize




















Additional research should be done into such a product as this is a simplistic version
and a more comprehensive model built that incorporates other factors such as
additional sources of risk and for mortgage insurance pricing so as to come up with an
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